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In the 1989 case City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court
held that minority business set-aside programs2 established by state and local
governments are subject to strict judicial scrutiny and so are constitutionally
permissible only in limited circumstances.3 Croson's impact has been devastat-
ing. Lower courts have already declared invalid the set-aside plans of a number
of cities, counties, and states. Many other state and local governments have
abandoned their plans rather than attempt to defend or restructure them Civil
rights advocates fear this trend will leave minority business enterprises (MBE's)
and minority workers even more severely underrepresented among those
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. A "set-aside" is an affirmative action program under which a designated share of government-
sponsored contracts is reserved for business enterprises owned by socially disadvantaged groups, usually
racial or ethnic minorities or women. This Note focuses only on programs aimed at aiding racial and ethnic
minorities. See infra note 9.
Most set-asides are established in terms of contracts, not jobs. They require that a certain percentage
of government contracts go to minority-owned firms, but impose no requirements as to the racial
composition of the work forces such contractors employ. However, reserving contracts for minority-owned
businesses generally results as well in increased job opportunities for people of color. This is because while
the work forces of most white-owned firms are disproportionately white, minority workers tend to be better
represented among the employees of minority-owned companies. Timothy Bates, Do Black-Owned
Businesses Employ Minority Workers? New Evidence, REV. BLACK POL ECON., Spring 1988, at 51, 53
(while 86% of minority business enterprises employ over 50% minority workers, 81.2% of white-owned
firms employ no minorities at all); ROBERT W. GLOVER, MINORITY ENTERPRISE IN CONSTRUCTION 27
(1977).
3. Writing for a four-Justice plurality in Croson, Justice O'Connor found that even though adopted
for 'benign' or 'remedial" purposes, set-aside programs nonetheless constitute suspect racial classifications,
triggering strict constitutional scrutiny. 488 U.S. at 493-95. This proposition constituted a holding of the
case since it was also endorsed by Justice Scalia, who concurred in judgment only. Id. at 520 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). O'Connor, joined by four Justices, went on to declare that only those set-aside
programs instituted to remedy the effects of identified past discrimination in a particular jurisdiction would
serve "a compelling [state] interest" and so survive strict scrutiny. Id. at 504-05.
4. According to the Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, as of March 1990,
20 city, county, and state governmental entities had voluntarily terminated or suspended their set-aside
programs. The programs of 46 others were being reevaluated. Nine jurisdictions had been enjoined from
enforcing their set-aside laws after their plans failed to withstand Croson-type scrutiny. Litigation was
pending against 37 other jurisdictions. See Memorandum from Anthony W. Robinson, President, Minority
Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, to Members of Congress (Mar. 30, 1990) (on file
with author).
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benefiting from public works spending, thus exacerbating two already critical
problems: underemployment among people of color and slow MBE business
development.
Most experts believe that with appropriate studies documenting the past
incidence and present persistence of discrimination in the construction trades,
in most parts of the country set-aside programs can still be fashioned in accor-
dance with the dictates of Croson.6 Still, states and municipalities are now less
likely to act voluntarily to ensure greater minority participation in public
contracting, and so advocates must search for alternative strategies to combat
this underrepresentation. This Note argues that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act7 provides a basis for challenging in court many government practices that
hamper greater minority participation in public contracting. The argument is
this: Title VI-the provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act banning racial
discrimination in federally funded programs-incorporates the "disparate
impact" definition of discrimination.8 Many seemingly neutral public
contracting practices have the effect of disproportionately excluding people of
color from participation in public works projects. Such procedures violate the
disparate impact standard and thus are prohibited by Title VI except where
shown to be necessary.9
Set-asides attempt to combat present discrimination and to counteract the
effects of past discrimination by requiring that public contracts be distributed
so as to achieve certain bottom-line results. A Title VI claim would attempt to
eradicate discrimination, not by mandating certain results, but by policing the
process whereby contracts are let. Croson in no way limited the legality of
efforts aimed at identifying and prohibiting discriminatory processes; indeed,
5. See Michael D. Hinds, Court Rulings Put Minority Businesses in Trouble; When Racially Based
Set-Asides Were Found Unconstitutional, Many Companies Failed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1991, at Al.
6. See Anthony W. Robinson, Satisfying the Croson Standard, in HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
101ST CONG., IST SESS., MINORITY BUSINESS SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS: THE C1ny OF RICHMOND V. JA.
CROSON-A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES BY CONSTITUTIONAL SCHOLARS AND ECONOMISTS, SERIAL NO. 11,
at 56 (Comm. Print 1990) [hereinafter CROSON COLLECTION]; Barry Goldstein, Set-Asides After City of
Richmond v. Croson, in id. at 35; San Francisco Lawyers Comm. for Urban Affairs & Equal Rights
Advocates, Affirmative Action Handbook, 3 YALE IL. & LIB. (forthcoming 1992); see also Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City & County of S.F., 748 F. Supp. 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aft'd, 950 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1991) (refusing to enjoin post-Croson set-aside).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4a (1988), quoted infra text accompanying note 17.
8. Under the disparate impact definition, practices having a disproportionate adverse impact on protected
groups are deemed discriminatory regardless of whether the practices are motivated by invidious racial
animus. Title VI itself bans only intentional discrimination, but the agency regulations implementing the
statute prohibit practices yielding a discriminatory effect. See infra text accompanying notes 21-26;
regulations cited infra note 25.
9. The strategy proposed in this Note is not available as a means for combating the underrepresentation
of women workers and female-owned firms in public contracting because there exists no federal law
imposing a general ban on sex discrimination in programs receiving federal aid. Title VI only forbids
discrimination on account of race, color, or national origin. Although Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988), prohibits sex discrimination, that statute applies only to federally
funded educational institutions.
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the Croson standard does not even apply to acts of Congress such as
Title VI.[' Thus, even after Croson, Title VI offers a way to hold contracting
states and municipalities accountable for the way they distribute the benefits
flowing from taxpayer-funded development. 1
The Title VI limits outlined in this Note apply to all types of government
contracting and, indeed, to the distribution of all other categories of benefits
by governmental entities. However, this Note uses the example of publicly
funded construction work for two reasons. First, explication using one concrete
context as a point of reference best illustrates the mechanics and practical
import of this proposed application of Title VI. Second, public works projects
administered by state and local governments are one of the most important
means by which public dollars are injected into local economies. The way these
funds are distributed is therefore of critical economic and social significance.
Part I of this Note explains the scope of the problem facing civil rights
advocates after Croson and clarifies why Title VI provides a promising basis
on which to challenge minority underrepresentation. Part II confronts two
potential obstacles to such a Title VI claim. There the Note explains that on
account of the changes in Title VI effected by the Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987 (CRRA), 2 the first of these no longer poses a problem. As for the
second, the Note argues that, properly understood, it should never have been
seen as an obstacle at all. Having established that Title VI does indeed reach
discrimination in governmental contracting, the Note proceeds in Part III to
discuss how the disparate impact definition of discrimination is applied under
Title VI and explains what particular sorts of contracting practices are
susceptible to challenge under the statute.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of the Problem
Even after Croson, not all set-asides are subject to strict scrutiny. Croson
did not overrule Fullilove v. Klutznick,"3 the 1980 decision in which the
Supreme Court sanctionedfederally imposed set-asides.14 Croson and Fullilove
10. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 13-14.
11. This Note does not argue that Title VI requires federal funds recipients to adopt set-asides. A
Title VI suit would, however, provide a means of establishing a record documenting the exclusion of people
of color from public contracting through discriminatory government practices. Since that record might then
be invoked by the defendant government were it to seek later to defend or establish a set-aside plan, Title VI
actions brought against sympathetic cities or states might play a useful role in laying the groundwork for
defensible post-Croson set-asides.
12. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
14. City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486-91 (1989). One year after Croson, the
Court reaffirmed Fullilove's vitality when it held in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3008-09
(1990), that federal race-based preferences are subject only to intermediate tier scrutiny-not the strict
scrutiny applied to state plans under Croson.
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together establish a bifurcated constitutional standard under which federally
mandated set-asides are generally permitted while city- and state-imposed plans
are tolerated only in limited circumstances.
Many federal statutes providing funds to states15 for public works
programs currently include set-aside provisions. These requirements apply,
however, only to state-administered projects that are "primarily federally
funded.' 16 They therefore leave untouched the underrepresentation of
minorities in jointly financed projects not deemed "primarily federal" and in
other state-ran projects funded entirely with nonfederal money. The proposed
Title VI claim would provide a means of reaching these categories of
construction jobs, which otherwise are not subject to federal regulation.
B. Applicability of Title VI
Title VI provides that "No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."'17 A great many public works projects
are beyond the reach of federal set-asides. Most such projects are covered by
the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI, however, on account of the
Civil Rights Restoration Act. That law defines expansively the term "program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"--the statutory provision
demarcating Title VI's reach. After the CRRA, receipt of even a small amount
of federal aid by any part of a state agency is sufficient to impose Title VI's
nondiscrimination requirements on all of the institution's operations.'8 Since
almost all state agencies that sponsor construction projects receive at least a
little federal aid,19 Title VI provides grounds for attacking minority
15. For simplicity's sake, this Note speaks mostly of states when discussing the nonfederal political
subdivisions whose contracting practices the contemplated litigation seeks to challenge. The analysis that
follows, however, applies equally to projects run by county and municipal governments.
16. Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1551 (W.D. Wis. 1990). Fiedler
found that a project 70-75% financed with federal money qualified as "primarily federally funded." Id. at
1544 n.6.
17. Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
18. Civil Rights Restoration Act, § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988). Note that in order for Title VI
limits to attach, federal funds must go to the particular program or activity funded. Receipt of funds by one
agency within a state government is not sufficient to extend Title VI coverage to activities of other agencies,
even when all are subdivisions of the same chartered governmental unit.
The proposition that the CRRA imposed an institution-wide scope on Title VI is uncontroversial
because effecting such coverage was the basic purpose of the Restoration Act. See infra text accompanying
notes 63-70. The subtly different issue addressed below concerns not whether Title VI applies to the
operations of federally funded state agencies, but rather what constitutes the scope of its prohibition. See
infra Part II.
19. For catalogs of the various sorts of federal aid currently extended to state and local governments,
see ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A CATALOG OF FEDERAL GRANT-IN-AID
PROGRAMS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: GRANTS FUNDED FY 1989 (1989); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., 1991
CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE (1991).
1580 [Vol. 101: 1577
Title VI
underrepresentation, even in an agency's entirely state-funded projects. 20
Title VI holds promise as a tool for counteracting the consequences of
Croson because it allows plaintiffs to challenge contracting practices under the
disparate impact definition of discrimination. This was established in 1983 in
Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission.21 There the Supreme
Court held that while Title VI itself requires a showing of discriminatory intent
to prove a violation, the statute delegates to federal agencies the discretion to
incorporate effects-based definitions of discrimination into their regulations
implementing the statute.' Because Guardians' bifurcated holding did not
reflect the views of any single Court majority, and because of changes in Court
personnel over the past nine years, some observers doubt that Guardians will
survive when the Court next examines Title VI.23 For the time being, however,
Guardians is the law, and Congress' strong reaffirmation of the disparate
impact doctrine in the Civil Rights Act of 199124 may lead the Court to
hesitate before overruling the Guardians holding.
Current Title VI regulations include effects-based definitions in their rules
detailing the nondiscrimination duties imposed on institutions choosing to
accept federal aid.' Since Guardians held that private litigants may sue state
20. The proposed Title VI claim would not target the practices of the federal government itself. In part
this is because the problem there is less dire: many statutes funding the construction of federal facilities
still require set-asides; additionally, federally run projects are governed by the stronger affirmative action
requirements of Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app.
at 398 (1988). Anotherreason for excluding federal agencies, however, is that it is unsettled whether Title VI
suits may be brought against the federal government. Compare Young v. Pierce, 628 F. Supp. 1037, 1057
(E.D. Tex. 1985) and Little Earth of United Tribes v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 584 F. Supp.
1292, 1297 (D. Minn. 1983) with NAACP v. Medical Ctr., Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1254 n.27 (3d Cir. 1979)
and Community Bhd. v. Lynn Redev. Auth., 523 F. Supp. 779, 782 & n.2 (D. Mass. 1981).
21. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
22. Guardians elicited six separate opinions from a fragmented Court. The case's two-part holding on
this issue was supported in its entirety by only three members. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 643-45 (Stevens,
J., joined by Brennan & Blackmun, J., dissenting). Two other Justices endorsed the broader view that both
the implementing regulations and the statute itself properly incorporate the disparate impact definition of
discrimination. Id. at 589-93 (White, J.); id. at 616-24 (Marshall, 1, dissenting). A majority of five Justices
thus agreed that at least the Title VI effects test regulations were valid. Id. at 584 n.2 (White, 3.); id. at 608
n.l (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (each summarizing case's holding). Two years later in a unanimous
opinion, the Court restated-although only in dicta--the rule of Guardians, reaffirming that the case stands
for the proposition described above. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 292-94 (1985); see also Latinos
Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st
Cir. 1986); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir.
1985); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F2d 969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1984) (all applying Guardians standard).
23. Telephone Interview with David Tatel, former Director, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 1977-79 (Oct. 30, 1990).
24. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat 1071. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
25. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 15.3(b)(2) (1991) (Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. § 1040.13(c)-(d) (1991) (Energy);
15 C.F.R. § 8A(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Commerce); 22 C.F.R. § 141.3(b)(2) (1991) (State); 24 C.F.R.
§ IA(b)(2)(i), (3) (1991) (Housing & Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Justice);
29 C.F.R. § 31.3(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Labor); 31 C.F.R. § 51.52(b)(1)(vi), (3)-(4) (1991) (Treasury);
32 C.F.R. § 300.4(b)(2) (1991) (Defense); 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Education); 38 C.F.R.
§ 18.3(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Veterans Affairs); 43 C.F.R. § 17.3(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Interior); 45 C.F.R.
§ 80.3(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Health & Human Services); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2)-(3) (1991) (Transportation).
For the regulations of agencies beneath cabinet rank, see C.F.R. INDEX 103-09 (1991).
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government recipients of federal funds directly under the Title VI effects test
regulations,z Title VI provides a means for challenging the public contracting
practices of state agencies so long as the defendant agencies receive aid under
some federal program.
C. Mechanics of a Title VI Claim
The demise of state set-asides in the wake of Croson will result both in
fewer public works contracts going to MBE's and in fewer jobs in public
construction projects going to minority workers2 Title VI litigation seeking
to address these problems would therefore concern itself with the interests of
two aggrieved groups: minority construction firm owners and minority
employees of construction contractors and subcontractors.
1. Contracting
In an effort to combat the underrepresentation of MBE's among contractors
working on public projects, Title VI litigants would examine the methods by
which sponsoring state agencies distribute construction contracts. Such a
challenge would focus on the procedures and criteria used to select prime
contractors. When a particular factor or element of a selection process, though
neutral on its face, disproportionately excludes qualified MBE's from eligibility
for public contracts, plaintiffs would challenge the practice as violating Title VI.
Although a showing of disparate impact establishes a prima facie case of
liability under Title VI, state defendants may counter with a variety of
affirmative defenses. Generally, plaintiffs will prevail only when courts reject
such defenses as unconvincing or when plaintiffs demonstrate the availability
of alternative contracting practices that are less discriminatory in their effect
but still serve the state's legitimate needs. 2
2. Subcontracting
Title VI litigation would also challenge the manner in which states permit
subcontracts to be distributed under public works projects. This claim would
focus on the procedures and requirements (if any) states impose on prime
26. As the editors of the Harvard Law Review wrote, 'In Guardians, six Justices recognized a private
right to enforce title VI and its regulations against state and local agencies receiving federal funds. They
failed to make clear, though, whether the source of this right is title VI itself or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus
it remains uncertain whether title VI may also be enforced againstprivate entities thatreceive federal funds."
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, 97 HARv. L. REV. 70, 250-51 (1983) (footnotes omitted). Since the
contemplated litigation would target state and local governmental entities, the availability to plaintiffs of
a private right of action is settled.
27. See discussion supra note 2 and text accompanying notes 1-5.
28. See infra Part ]ILA.2.b-c.
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contractors, governing the way those contractors farm out subcontracts for the
projects they oversee. In most circumstances, states leave the subcontracting
process entirely unregulated. Such a policy makes no difference, however, for
the applicability of Title VI. A state's decision not to regulate
subcontracting-thereby delegating unfettered authority to prime contractors
to distribute subcontracts-is as much a policy choice as is a decision to
regulate.29 Title VI limits the way states may distribute benefits like contracts,
and states cannot evade responsibility for compliance simply by ceding
decisionmaking authority to a prime contractor.
A prime contractor's subcontracting procedures count as policies of the
sponsoring state for Title VI purposes and so may be challenged in a Title VI
subcontracting claim brought against the state as defendant. The agency rules
implementing Title VI support this proposition. Most of these regulations
prohibit recipients of federal funds from "directly or through contractual or
other arrangements, utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have
the effect of subjecting persons to discrimination."3 This language clarifies
that Title VI holds federal funds recipients responsible for "acts of racial
discrimination carried out through third parties."3' Subcontracting policies are
thus subject to Title VI limits. When such practices have a disproportionate
adverse impact on MBE's, they are subject to challenge in the same way that
practices of prime contractors are, and such claims can be brought directly
against the sponsoring state agency.
32
29. Cf. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928) (for purposes of constitutional takings analysis,
state decision not to regulate a given subject constitutes state policy choice no less than decision to regulate);
Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 (1987) (discussing Miller).
30. Department ofTransportationTitle VIRegulations,49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (1991) (emphasis added).
For similar language in other agencies' Title VI rules, see regulations cited supra note 25.
31. 3 RICHARD CAPPALLI, FEDERAL GRANTs & COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS § 19:37, at 131 (1982).
32. One commentator has argued that U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S.
597 (1986), prevents Title VI from reaching discrimination against subcontractors. Robert E. Suggs, Racial
Discrimination in Business Transactions, 42 HASTINGS LJ. 1257, 1271-72 (1991). Paralyzed Veterans held
that even though federal aid to public airport authorities benefits private airlines, such indirect aid does not
count as "federal financial assistance" to the airlines, and so the federal funding-linked antidiscrimination
laws do not apply to the airlines of their own force. That holding does not, however, limit the availability
of the Title VI claims proposed in this Note. As Justice Marshall's dissent in Paralyzed Veterans noted,
even if parties receiving federal funds indirectly cannot be sued under Title VI, the funds recipient can be
held liable for the discriminatory practices of indirectly funded third parties. 477 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). In the Paralyzed Veterans context, the discriminatory conduct of the private airlines, while not
violating any duty imposed on the airlines by federal law, might nonetheless constitute a violation on the
part of the federally funded airport operator. Similarly, in publicly funded construction work, discrimination
by contractors against subcontractors may not be actionable under Title VI in lawsuits brought against
contractors, but such behavior violates the Title VI obligations of the federally funded sponsoring state
agency and so can be challenged in a suit brought against the state as defendant.
Moreover, the precedential vitality of Paralyzed Veterans is in doubt since the Paralyzed Veterans
Court relied on Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), the narrowing Supreme Court interpretation
that Congress statutorily overruled with the Civil Rights Restoration Act. See infra text accompanying notes
63-70.
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3. Job Distribution
Another important social good flowing from public works spending is the
creation of jobs for construction workers. By selecting a particular contractor
for a job, a state in effect selects a group of workers to benefit from that public
project. Title VI litigation would seek to ensure that public prime contractor
and subcontractor selection practices distribute employment opportunities
equitably by examining the racial composition of the work forces of firms
selected for public projects.33 Where particular methods or criteria serve
systematically to steer contracts toward firms with disproportionately white
work forces, they are subject to Title VI challenge.
D. Preferability of Title VI to Title VII as a Cause of Action
Most public contracting rules and procedures are neutral on their face and
cannot easily be shown to have been adopted for the purpose of discriminating
against people of color. The discriminatory consequences of such practices can
therefore only be challenged under an effects-based definition of discrimination.
While Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Ac extends liability for
employment practices yielding a disparate racial impact,35 Title VI is in
several respects a superior tool for combating minority underrepresentation in
public contracting.
Title VII only prohibits discriminatory employment practices36 and so does
not reach discrimination in the letting of prime contracts and subcontracts to
construction firms. While Title VII renders discriminatory employee selection
practices actionable, the provision does not provide a basis for challenging such
policies at the state governmental level. The proposed litigation would seek to
hold states responsible for the way they distribute the benefits flowing from
public works projects. In most circumstances minority construction workers
employed by construction contractors and subcontractors do not qualify as
"employees" of the contracting state for Title VII purposes,317 and so do not
33. As noted above, the exercise ofdelegated discretion by prime contractors in selecting subcontractors
counts as a policy of the state for Title VI purposes. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
Therefore, a state violates its Title VI obligations when it distributes either prime contracts or subcontracts
in a way that systematically favors firms that do not employ people of color.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-6 (1988).
35. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonlo, 490
U.S. 642 (1989) (weakening Griggs standard); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a),
105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)) (restoring Griggs standard). See infra
text accompanying notes 93-95.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (titled "Unlawful Employment Practices").
37. Although federal labor laws such as the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1988), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988), and Title VII define employment in
broader terms than do common law agency principles, even by this standard construction workers rarely
qualify as "employees" of the state. See BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GRossMAN, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW 1000-03 (2d ed. 1983).
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have a cause of action against the state under that statute.
By suing individual contractors and subcontractors directly, employment
discrimination claims attacking the practices of particular employers can be
brought under Title VII. Such suits do not, however, allow workers to challenge
a state's selection of a particular construction firnm-the "meta-employment"
decision-because a state's decision to contract with a particular employer does
not constitute an "employment practice"'38 of that employer within the meaning
of Title VII. Thus, only Title VI provides a means for challenging the
discriminatory effects on workers of decisions made by states further
"upstream" in the job distribution process.
II. POTENTIAL OBSTACLES TO A TITLE VI CLAIM:
THE IBD AND SECTION 604
A. The Potential Limits to Title VI
Any attempt to use Title VI in the manner described must first confront
two limiting doctrines which arguably prevent Title VI from reaching most
discrimination in public contracting. The first is the "intended beneficiary"
doctrine (IBD). If it governed Title VI, this doctrine would pose an obstacle
to both the contract and job distribution claims outlined above. The IBD holds
that Title VI does not require recipients of federal funds to stop engaging in
all types of discrimination. Rather, on this view, Title VI bans discrimination
only against the "intended beneficiaries" of the particular federal aid in
question. Since MBE owners and minority laborers are not the intended
beneficiaries of the vast majority of federal aid received by state agencies, the
IBD would preclude most attempts to use Title VI to target discrimination in
public contracting.39
This Note argues that though it was unclear whether the IBD properly
applied under Title VI in its original form,4 the possibility that an IBD limit
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
39. Even if the IBD did appropriately govern Title VI, some job and contract distribution claims would
still be available because minority construction workers and MEE's are among the intended beneficiaries
of some federal grant statutes. For instance, the very pieces of Title VI's legislative history in which the
IBD was first articulated cited construction workers whose jobs are created under federal public works
programs as classic examples of intended beneficiaries. See 110 CoNG. REC. 10,075-76 (1964) (reprinting
Letter from Attorney General Kennedy to Senator Cooper (Apr. 29, 1964)); 110 CONG. REc. 6545 (1964)
(remarks of Sen. Humphrey). As for MBE's, any federal statute requiring set-asides would include among
its intended beneficiaries those categories of firms targeted by the set-aside requirement. Therefore, even
under the IBD, Title VI would reach contracting discrimination by state agencies so long as the agencies
receive at least some aid under federal statutes that either mandate MBE set-asides or else are aimed at
creating jobs for construction workers.
Although in some circumstances Title VI would therefore afford plaintiffs a cause of action in spite
of the IBD, many state agencies receive no such aid, and so contracting discrimination by them would not
be actionable under Title VI.
40. See infra Part II.B-C.
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might currently govern Title VI was foreclosed when Congress amended the
statute in the Civil Rights Restoration Act Not only is the legislative intent
behind the CRRA incompatible with the IBD," but the fact that Congress
codified another limiting doctrine-a narrower "ultimate beneficiary"
restriction-in the CRRA ought to be viewed as a congressional decision to
substitute that constraint for the broader IBD.42
The IBD demarcates the scope of Title VI with reference to the plaintiff,
3
class protected by the statute. It restricts Title VI coverage to just one category
of behavior by federal funds recipients: discrimination against intended
beneficiaries of federal aid in the distribution of goods and benefits. The IBD
thus sharply limits the types of plaintiffs who may bring Title VI suits. In
contrast, the ultimate beneficiary doctrine imposes no categorical limits on the
types of discrimination by federal funds recipients prohibited under Title VI.
Instead, this doctrine carves out a limited exception to Title VI liability defined
with reference to the defendant class subject to liability under the statute. Under
this theory, discrimination by private citizens receiving certain specified types
of federal aid is excluded from Title VI's scope. Because the ultimate
beneficiary exception only immunizes certain private citizens from Title VI
liability, it would pose no obstacle to a Title VI public contracting claim
brought against a state governmental defendant.
The second potential obstacle to the proposed use of Title VI is found in
section 604, which excludes from Title VI's scope "the employment practice[s]
of any employer.., except where a primary objective of the Federal financial
assistance is to provide employment." This provision simply constitutes a
subset of the broader IBD restriction, codifying the IBD with respect to one
subcategory of discrimination by federal funds recipients: discrimination against
intended beneficiary employees. This Note argues that, properly understood,
section 604 does not limit the availability of the Title VI claims proposed in
this Note. Because section 604 applies only to employment practices, at most
it poses a problem only for a Title VI job distribution claim. Thus, even if this
Note's argument against the applicability of this constraint is ultimately
unpersuasive, a Title VI contract distribution claim would still be available.
B. The Legislative History of Title VI
In order to understand the debate over the validity of the IBD and over the
meaning of Section 604, it is first necessary to examine the congressional
41. See infra Part ILD.i.
42. See infra Part ILD.2.
43. This Note's use of the terms "plaintiff' and "defendanf' when discussing the purposes of the 1964
Civil Rights Act is somewhat ahistorical since it was not clear in 1964 whether Titles VI and VII would
be subject to private enforcement. The Note uses the terms for the sake of clarity.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1988).
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debates on Title VI. When the Eighty-eighth Congress considered the
Johnson administration's civil rights bill, Title VI of the draft legislation
engendered substantial controversy. Some members of Congress feared the
provision would threaten small farmers receiving federal crop subsidies and
pensioners receiving social security or veterans' benefits with the loss of their
payments if they discriminated in hiring agricultural laborers or domestic
workers.46 Since employers with fewer than twenty-five47 workers had already
been exempted from Title VII's ban on employment discrimination, it was
important to know whether such employment relationships were exempt from
Title VI as well.
In opening the debate on the civil rights bill in March 1964, Senator Hubert
Humphrey attempted to allay those fears by explaining that Title VI would not
reach such situations4 s Although Humphrey stated unequivocally that this sort
of discrimination was beyond the scope of Title VI, he offered two seemingly
contradictory rationales in his explanation. Humphrey first explained that
Title VI did not cover such farmers and pensioners because they were the
"ultimate beneficiaries" of the farm support and social security programs.4 9
The understanding behind this view, the ultimate beneficiary doctrine, is that
Title VI was meant to ban discrimination by federally funded institutions, but
that simple receipt of government social insurance benefits by private persons
was not meant to carry with it an elaborate array of statutory conditions. Since
Title VI's prohibition incorporates the far-reaching disparate impact standard,
such a limitation is sensible. Without this limit, many of the actions of private
citizens would be subject to unwieldy Title VI restrictions since most citizens
today receive federally financed benefits of some sort.
In the same speech, however, Humphrey went on to offer a slightly
different rationale for the exclusion. He explained that Title VI would not reach
employment discrimination by farmers because "[t]he various Federal programs
of assistance to farmers... were not intended to deal with problems of farm
employment and farm employees are generally not participants in or
45. Since the section 604 exclusion constitutes a subset of the broader IBD, reading an implied IBD
limit into Title VI would render section 604 redundant. Because canons of statutory interpretation strongly
disfavor such constructions, see infra text accompanying note 83, the plain language of the statute militates
against recognition of a nontextual IBD limit. Proponents of the "plain meaning" approach to statutory
interpretation should reject the IBD on this basis alone since they maintain that it is improper to consult
legislative history except when statutory language is ambiguous.
46. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 11,615 (1964) (Sen. Cooper).
47. The original Title VII excluded employers of fewer than 25 from the provision's obligations. Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988)),
reduced that number to 15.
48. Senator Humphrey's views provide important indications of the legislative intent behind Title VI
because he was a major sponsor of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and his remarks on Title VI are among the
only detailed contemporaneous explications of the provision's function.
49. 110 CoNG. REc. 6545 (1964).
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beneficiaries of such programs." 50 This explanation-the IBD-is subtly but
significantly different from the ultimate beneficiary doctrine. Instead of just
excluding discrimination by certain ultimate beneficiary private citizen
defendants from Title VI's otherwise broad scope, the IBD only includes within
Title VI's ban discrimination against intended beneficiary plaintiffs. The IBD
thus results in a much narrower statutory prohibition.
In the months following Humphrey's remarks, disagreement and confusion
persisted as to the intended scope of Title VI. Seeking clarification, Senator
John Sherman Cooper wrote to Attorney General Robert Kennedy. Kennedy's
response, however, relied on Senator Humphrey's earlier remarks and so
repeated Humphrey's confused presentation of the conflicting ultimate
beneficiary and intended beneficiary theories. 5'
In order to settle this dispute with respect to the chief subject of
contention-employment-Senator Cooper proposed section 604, the
employment exception clause, as an amendment to the bill. It reads: "Nothing
contained in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this
subchapter by any department or agency with respect to any employment
practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except
where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment." 52 Section 604 largely settled the debate over the circumstances
under which Title VI might reach employment discrimination.5 3 The terms
used by the various members of Congress in presenting and discussing the
amendment revealed, however, lingering disagreement over whether,
section 604 notwithstanding, Title VI incorporated a general, nontextual IBD
limitation. 4
C. The Unresolved Question of the IBD: 1964-1988
During the 1970's and 1980's, federal courts disagreed as to whether
Congress had meant for Title VI or for its statutory analogues, Title IX of the
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. Letter from Attorney General Kennedy to Senator Cooper (Apr. 29, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG.
REC. 10,075-76 (1964) (citing remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1988).
53. While section 604 laid down a rule, it by no means made clear when the rule ought to apply. The
provision offers little guidance as to how to define the section's terms. Depending on who qualifies as an
"employer," what counts as an "employment practice," and how one identifies the "primary objective" of
a federal grant statute, Title VI may or may not apply to a given situation. This ambiguity may cause some
critics to argue that section 604 prohibits the Title VI claims on behalf of unintended beneficiary
construction workers proposed in this Note. For an explanation why section 604 should properly be read
to permit such a claim, see infra Part ILE.
54. Those believing a general IBD limit governed Title VI viewed section 604 as a simple clarification
of the broader restriction. Those rejecting the IBD, however, regarded section 604 as effecting a substantive
change in Title VI's scope. Compare 110 CONG. REC. 12,714 (1964) ('We have made no changes of
substance in Title VI... ") (Sen. Humphrey) with 110 CONG. REc. 14,220 (1964) ("Substantive changes
are made in section[] ... 604.") (Sen. Holland).
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Education Amendments of 1972Vs and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,56 to be limited by the IBD. Because Title IX and the Rehabilitation
Act were modeled after Title VI," courts look to Title VI's legislative history
for guidance when attempting to divine the legislative intents of the Ninety-
second and Ninety-third Congresses in enacting the later statutes.
Eventually, the Supreme Court resolved the issue for Title IX and the
Rehabilitation Act, ruling that no IBD limit obtains under those laws 8 These
holdings rested, however, not on the legislative history of Title VI, but on those
of the two later-enacted statutes. The decisions thus offered no comment on the
existence of an intended beneficiary limitation under Title VI.59
During the 1980's, a handful of courts hearing Title VI cases held that the
IBD did indeed apply under that statute and on that basis dismissed suits
brought by unintended beneficiary plaintiffs.60 All of these decisions cite as
authority two circuit court Rehabilitation Act opinions in which courts of
appeals, citing Senator Humphrey's remarks, concluded that the IBD properly
governed Title VI and thus also limited the subsequently enacted Rehabilitation
Act 6 Because these decisions considered Title VI only for the purpose of
assessing the scope of protection offered by the Rehabilitation Act, their
statements with respect to Title VI are arguably dicta. Even more importantly,
the cases' holdings with respect to the Rehabilitation Act were subsequently
overruled by the Supreme Court. 2
D. The Civil Rights Restoration Act: The IBD Question Settled
Before the Supreme Court had the opportunity to rule on the appropriate-
55. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by educational institutions
receiving federal funds.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bans discrimination against the
handicapped in federally funded programs.
57. U.S. Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 600 & n.4 (1986) (section 504
modeled after Title VI); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-95 & n.16 (1979) (Title IX
modeled after Title VI).
58. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 529-30 & n.20 (1982) (Title IX); Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632-35 (1984) (section 504). These cases presented the question of
whether employment discrimination against unintended beneficiary workers was actionable under Title IX
and section 504. Because neither statute includes an employment exception clause like Title VI's
section 604, each case turned on whether a nontextual, general IBD limit governed the statute in question.
59. Writing for the Court in North Haven, Justice Blackmun flagged as unresolved the question of
whether Title VI incorporated an IBD limit. Although he criticized the petitioners' assertion that Title VI's
legislative history unequivocally supports the IBD, Blackmun found it unnecessary to decide the issue at
that time. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 529-30 & n.20.
60. Doe v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 418-21 (7th Cir. 1986); Laramore v. Illinois Sports
Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n v.
Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202, 1208-09 & n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1987); Griggs v. Lexington Police Dep't, 672 F. Supp.
36, 39 & n.2 (D. Mass. 1987); Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424, 1429-30 (N.D.
Ill. 1983).
61. Simpson v. Reynolds Metals Co., 629 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 n.17 (7th Cir. 1980); Carmi v. Metro.
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d 672, 674-75 n.4 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980).
62. Consolidated Rail Corp., 465 U.S. at 632-35.
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ness of the IBD under Title VI, Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987.63 In clarifying that Title VI's prohibition is institution-wide in
scope, the CRRA amendments foreclosed the possibility that the statute might
be governed by an intended beneficiary limitation. An IBD limit is incompatible
with the basic logic and purpose of the Restoration Act. Moreover, the past
Title VI interpretations singled out for approval and disapproval by the CRRA's
sponsors, the understanding of Title VI evinced at the CRRA hearings, and the
codification of the narrower ultimate beneficiary exception in section 7 of the
CRRA all compel this conclusion. These arguments will be developed in the
subsections that follow.
1. Institution-Wide Application of Title VI
The CRRA reversed Grove City College v. Bell,' a 1984 decision in
which the Supreme Court construed narrowly the protective scope of the three
statutes banning discrimination by federal funds recipients. Grove City held that
Title IX's ban on sex discrimination "under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance ' 6 meant that federal aid received by a
subunit of a larger institution triggers a nondiscrimination duty only with
respect to that particular subunit. Because the three statutes prohibiting
discrimination by federal funds recipients are interpreted in parallel fashion,
Grove City's holding applied to Title VI as well. 5
The Restoration Act gave Title VI an extraordinarily broad, institution-wide
scope. In the process, the possibility that Title VI might admit an intended
beneficiary limitation was necessarily foreclosed. The Restoration Act clarifies
Title VI's scope by inserting a broad definition for the term "program or
activity" as it appears in the statute's main provision, section 601. 67 As a
result, Title VI's ban on "discrimination ... under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance"68 applies on an "institution-wide"69
basis to "all of the operations"7 of a recipient entity.
Consideration of the statute's inherent logic reveals the incompatibility of
the Restoration Act with the IBD. The purpose of the Act was to broaden the
applicability of Title VI's nondiscrimination duty to include subunits of
federally funded institutions that do not themselves receive federal aid. Since
these subunits are not federally funded, participants in their activities are by
63. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). Those provisions of the Restoration Act amending
Title VI are codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (1988), and 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
64. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
65. Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
66. United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1548 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1210 (1988) (applying Grove City to Title VI).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988), quoted supra text accompanying note 17.
68. Title VI, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
69. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 2(2), 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
70. Id. § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a.
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definition not the intended beneficiaries of the federal aid at issue. The mission
of the Restoration Act was therefore to extend Title VI's protections to persons
not qualifying as intended beneficiaries. To read the IBD back into the amended
statute would render the CRRA meaningless.
The Restoration Act's own preamble supports this view. It declares the
Act's aim of "restor[ing] [Title VI's] prior consistent and long-standing
executive branch interpretation."71 The report of the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee, the statute's official legislative history, cites testimony
of J. Stanley Pottinger, the former Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights
in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, as evincing that prior prevailing
interpretation.72 In that testimony, Pottinger described past federal enforcement
practice in terms incompatible with the IBD.7 3 As one of the "prior ...
executive branch interpretation[s]" the CRRA sought to restore, Pottinger's view
bolsters the conclusion that the amended Title VI was not meant to include an
IBD limit.
Congressional hearings on the bill provide further evidence that the Restora-
tion Act was understood as banning all discrimination in covered
institutions-not just that against intended beneficiaries. In those hearings, a
variety of Reagan Administration officials, offering examples of the practices
the new bill would reach, showed that they understood the amended Title VI
as not subject to an IBD limit.74
71. Id. § 2(2), 20 U.S.C. § 1687.
72. S. REP. NO. 64, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 11 (citing Civil
Rights Act of 1984: Joint Hearings on H.R. 5490 Before the Comm. on Education and Labor and the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 258
(1984) [hereinafter 1984 House Hearings] (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger)).
73. "Prior to the educational amendments of 1972, approximately 90 percent of Federal aid to higher
education was categorical money, primarily for research and development. No one in the Nixon
administration ever suggested that title VI applied to just to [sic] the physics laboratory of a major university
or to some other individual program of the university and not to the admissions program." 1984 House
Hearings, supra note 72, at 257 (statement of I. Stanley Pottinger). In such situations, the intended
beneficiaries of the federal research grants would be the physics department faculty or some anticipated
end-user of the research. The Nixon Administration nevertheless interpreted such aid as triggering a Title
VI ban on discrimination against unintended beneficiaries such as student applicants for admission to the
university.
74. Linda Chavez, then-Staff Director of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, testified: "[The bill]
establishes coverage of the non-educational commercial activities of institutions of higher education, even
when those activities do not serve students, faculty, or other educational functions.... Indeed, even the
investment policies of an institution might be subjected to coverage under these four statutes for the first
time." Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985: Joint Hearings on HR. 700 Before the Comm. on Education
and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1242 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 House Hearings].
Harry M. Singleton, then-Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Education,
stated similarly: "[Ul]nder [the bill], financial assistance flowing to only one 'part' of a university-one
department, building, college or graduate school-would create jurisdiction ... in non-educational
'operations' in which the university might be engaged such as broadcasting, rental of non-student housing
or even the management of its endowment fund." Id. at 289-90. Such nonstudent customers or tenants
discriminated against in the noneducational, commercial operations of a university would by no means
qualify as the intended beneficiaries of any federal aid received by the institution.
Another witness, William Bradford Reynolds, then-Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights,
confirmed that the bill would allow Title VI to reach discrimination in public accommodations and
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The Senate report also went out of its way to criticize Simpson v. Reynolds,
one of the very few cases finding that Title VI (and section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act) incorporate IBD limits.75 Terming it one of the "few
exceptions" to the courts' previous practice of interpreting the antidiscrimination
statutes broadly, 76 the Senate report singled out Simpson as one of the past
interpretations the CRRA was not intended to restore.
2. The Ultimate Beneficiary Exception
The Restoration Act's rejection of the IBD is also evident from section 7
of the Act, which exempts from coverage under the amended statutes those
"ultimate beneficiaries of Federal financial assistance excluded from coverage
before the enactment of [the CRRA]." 77 The Senate report shows that the
Restoration Act's drafters understood that the Eighty-eighth Congress in 1964
had sought to exclude from Title VI coverage "farmers receiving crop
subsidies," "persons receiving social security benefits, persons that receive
Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and individual recipients of food stamps."78
The Senate report cites from the portions of Title VI's legislative history that
articulate the contradictory IBD and ultimate beneficiary views of the scope
of Title VI.79 The report reads that inconsistent legislative history, however,
as mandating only the narrower ultimate beneficiary exception to Title VIV0
Quoting testimony from one of the hearings on the Restoration Act, the report
explains: "Congress was not concerned with regulating the activities of the tens
of millions of Americans who are the ultimate beneficiaries of the federal
financial assistance, but who in no sense operate a federally-financed program
or activity. Rather, Congress was concerned with the state agencies, the
educational institutions and others who operate programs ... .""1 Neither the
Senate report nor the CRRA itself ever acknowledges any IBD limit.
Section 7 ought to be viewed as the 100th Congress' interpretation of the
intended scope of Title VI based on its appraisal of the legislative history of
employment in a university cafeteria. Id. at 246. Since he did not claim the statute would apply only in those
instances where the customers or employees discriminated against in the cafeteria were students, Reynolds'
example would extend Title VI protection to persons other than intended beneficiaries of the university's
federal aid.
75. See discussion supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
76. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 72, at 10, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 12 (distinguishing
Simpson).
77. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 7, 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988) (emphasis added).
78. S. REP. No. 64, supra note 72, at 24, 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26, 27.
79. Id. at 24-25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26-27 (quoting Letter from Attorney General
Kennedy to Senator Cooper (Apr. 29, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REc. 10,075-76 (1964)). For a
discussion of the Kennedy letter, see supra text accompanying note 51.
80. Id. at 24-25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 26-27.
81. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27 (quoting 1985 House Hearings, supra note 74, at
1182 (statement of Daniel Marcus, former Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
1977-79, and former General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Agric., 1979-80)).
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the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Though congressional constructions of statutes are
not usually binding on the courts, the ultimate beneficiary interpretation is
authoritative because it was codified into a subsequent law: the CRRA. To read
the IBD back into the amended Title VI would render section 7 superfluous
since ultimate beneficiaries would then already have been excluded from
Title VI coverage under the broader IBD exception.82 In light of "the cardinal
rule of statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be
entirely redundant, '83 the Restoration Act must be interpreted as implicitly
rejecting the IBD. While it agreed that small farmers and pensioners were
meant to be excluded from Title VI liability, the 100th Congress decided that
this goal should be achieved through a mechanism much less sweeping than
the IBD.
E. Section 604: The Rule-of-Decision Reading
After the Restoration Act, the IBD is no longer a potential obstacle to the
Title VI claims this Note proposes. Title VI thus provides MBE's grounds for
challenging discriminatory state contracting and subcontracting practices,
regardless of whether plaintiff firms qualify as intended beneficiaries of any
federal aid received by defendant states. However, minority construction
workers who target states' job distribution practices will still face an additional
hurdle in the form of section 604.84
A Title VI job distribution claim would examine the racial composition of
the work forces employed by firms awarded public contracts and subcontracts.
Title VI suits would be brought against states employing contracting procedures
or criteria that systematically steer contracts toward firms employing few people
of color. The plaintiff class in these actions would consist of minority
construction workers employed by firms with less disproportionately white work
forces which have been excluded from public contracting as a result of the
challenged practices.
Some might argue that because such a claim relates to employment, it falls
within the preclusive scope of section 604. This conclusion is mistaken,
however, because it flies in the face of both the plain meaning of section 604's
text and the historical understanding of the provision within the structure of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. Section 604 prohibits "action under [Title VI]... with
respect to any employment practice of any employer." 5 A Title VI jobs claim,
82. In all circumstances where defendants qualify as ultimate beneficiaries, plaintiffs then by definition
cannot qualify as intended beneficiaries. Thus, all suits against which defendants would be immunized by
the ultimate beneficiary doctrine, plaintiffs would also be barred from bringing by the broader IBD.
83. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,778 (1988); see also Arcadia v. Ohio Power Co., 111 S. Ct.
415, 419 (1990); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 510 n.22 (1986).
84. This problem with section 604 would only arise where plaintiffs could not show that "the primary
objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." See supra note 39.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1988).
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however, is an action with respect to contracting practices. Moreover, the
challenged practices are not those of the plaintiffs' employer or of a firm with
which the plaintiffs seek employment; rather, they are the practices of the
sponsoring state agency in distributing construction contracts or in permitting
prime contractors to distribute subcontracts that are at issue in such a suit.
The selection of a contractor or subcontractor for a job does more than
direct profitable business toward that firm. It causes another benefit, paid hourly
work for laborers, to flow to the firm's work force. The fact that workers are
thus affected by contracting decisions and can challenge their distributional
consequences under Title VI does not, however, convert those contracting
decisions into employment practices.
An understanding of the role section 604 was meant to play in the larger
structure of the 1964 Civil Rights Act reinforces this conclusion. Title VII was
meant to be the principal legal apparatus regulating employment discrimination.
That provision renders discrimination actionable only where the relationship
between plaintiff and defendant is one of employee-employer.
86
Title VI, however, establishes a general ban on discrimination in federally
funded programs that does not depend on the existence of any particular legal
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. Had Title VI been permitted
to duplicate Title VII's coverage of discrimination in employment, it would
have rendered moot the carefully crafted exceptions to Title VII's prohibition
which, as compromises, had been necessary to build a coalition sufficient to
win passage of the statute.8
Section 604 was introduced by Senator Cooper in order to avoid precisely
this problem-to clarify "that it was not intended that title VI would impinge
on title VII.''88 In light of this purpose, the best way to understand section 604
is as a rule of decision, demarcating the boundary between the spheres regulated
by Titles VI and VII on the basis of the relationship existing between plaintiff
and defendant. If the relationship is one of employee-employer, then plaintiffs'
claims can only be asserted under Title VII (except where the "primary
objective" condition is satisfied); if the relationship is not, then the acts in
question are not "employment practice[s]" within the meaning of section 604
and so a Title VI cause of action may lie against federal funds recipients who
86. Although Title VII and the other federal labor laws have been construed as defining the employment
relationship in terms somewhat broader than those of the traditional common law agency doctrine, see supra
note 37, this subtle distinction is of no relevance to the discussion above.
87. For example, employees of state and local governments were deliberately excluded from the
protections of the original Title VII. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241,253-54 (1964). Had Title VI
been permitted to reach the employment relationship, discrimination against such workers would then have
been actionable under Title VI, thus defeating the very purpose of the Title VII exception. This would have
occurred since most state and local governments receive federal funding and are thus covered by Title VL
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 eliminated this exception. Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(5),
86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972).
88. 110 CONG. REc. 11,615 (1964) (Sen. Cooper). Under section 604, the Title VI regime overlaps
with that of Title VII only where the federal aid involved is for the purpose of creating jobs. Title VI, § 604,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1988).
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discriminate in distributing benefits.
In circumstances like the Title VI claim outlined above, the benefits at issue
are jobs, and the purpose of the suit is to challenge the way employment
opportunities are ultimately distributed between minority and white workers.
Nevertheless, because state contracting decisions are not employment practices,
the claim falls outside the scope of section 604's prohibition.
]I. APPLICATION OF A TITLE VI DISPARATE IMPACr CLAIM
TO DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC CONTRACTING
Since no IBD limitation applies under Title VI and section 604 serves only
a rule-of-decision function, there are no doctrinal obstacles to the proposed
Title VI challenge to the contract and job distribution practices of state public
works programs.8 9 The argument up to this point has, however, only
established the threshold proposition that Title VI limits do indeed apply to the
public contracting policies of state agencies receiving federal aid. The next task
is to show that enforcement of Title VI prohibitions would indeed reduce
minority underrepresentation in public contracting. The final part of this Note
first describes how the disparate impact standard of proof functions under
Title VI and then details what practical changes might be achieved by pursuing
a Title VI claim on behalf of minority prime contractors, subcontractors, and
construction workers.
A. Disparate Impact Under Title VI
1. The Title VII Disparate Impact Standard and Title VI
Although the Supreme Court in Guardians9° affirmed the validity of the
Title VI regulations incorporating the disparate impact definition of discrimina-
tion, the Court did not address the issue of the parties' evidentiary burdens in
a Title VI disparate impact suit. Lower courts adjudicating Title VI disparate
impact cases have all held that the evidentiary methodology developed under
Title VII is appropriately applied under Title VI as well.91 These decisions
89. The narrower ultimate beneficiary exclusion codified in section 7 of the Restoration Act poses no
problem for a Title VI public contracting claim since the defendant in the proposed suit-a state
agency-does not fall within section 7's exception. See supra text accompanying note 49; Parts II.A, ILD.2.
90. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); see also supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text.
91. See Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion (LUCHA) v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d
774, 785-87 (Ist Cir. 1986); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1417 (11th Cir. 1985); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); NAACP v. Medical Ctr.,
657 F.2d 1322, 1333-35 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc); Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 617-19 (2d Cir. 1980);
Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Committee for a Better
N. Phila v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., CIV.A.88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14,
1990); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202, 1209 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
cf. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Title IX case).
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have offered little explanation for why this should be so. Were it not for this
case law one might otherwise have presumed, in light of Title VI's structure
and purpose, that a disparate impact standard more demanding for defendants
than the Title VII variant would properly have applied under Title VI.92
The courts have instead appeared to treat the disparate impact methodology
developed under Title VII as a federal common law definition of discrimination
generally applicable under the modem civil rights acts. This standard apparently
functions as a conceptual overlay, defining the terms "discrimination" and
"because of race" as used by Congress in the different provisions of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.
The Title VII disparate impact mechanism emerged from a series of
Supreme Court decisions during the 1970's, beginning with Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.93 The Court substantially altered and weakened the standard in
1989 in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.94 The recently enacted Civil
Rights Act of 1991 (1991 CRA)95 reversed the Wards Cove modifications.
In light of the fact that the Title VII disparate impact model has been
treated as a federal common law definition of discrimination, the new Civil
Rights Act's restoration of the Griggs standard must govern Title VI as well.
This is true even though the new law amends only Title VII and makes no
mention of Title VI. When the Supreme Court cut back on Griggs in Wards
92. Normally, such statutory mechanics are controlled by the text, history, and purposes of each
individual law. Close examination of Title VI suggests that it imposes a more stringent disparate impact
prohibition than Title VII does. Title VI coverage extends only to parties who have elected to subject
themselves to the statute's requirements by accepting federal aid. In contrast, Title VII applies to all
employers-as that term is defined under the statute-and the law was enacted in the face of a strong
contrary common law presumption of"employment at will." See Sydney D. Watson, Reinvigorating Title VI:
Defending Health Care Discrimination-It Shouldn't Be So Easy, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 972 (1990).
Because Title VI is not coercive and does not fly in the face of any contrary common law presumption,
it need not defer as much as Title VII does to the convenience and economic needs of federal funds
recipients. As one Tennessee lawyer put it recently, "If you take the king's coin, you dance the king's
dance."
Indeed, the fact that Title VI-covered institutions enjoy benefits flowing from the federal fise creates
even more compelling quasi-constitutional grounds for application of an especially strong nondiscrimination
standard under the statute. while Congress was under no constitutional obligation to ban private
discrimination in employment, toleration of discrimination in the use and distribution of federal revenues
violates the government's duty to secure for all citizens the equal protection of the laws. See Ethridge v.
Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (extension of public contracts to construction firms discriminating
in employment violates equal protection).
In addition, the architecture of Title VII compelled acknowledgment of the availability to defendants
of affirmative defenses against liability for at least some practices yielding disparate racial impacts. (For
a discussion of affirmative defenses under Title VII, see infra text accompanying notes 104-106.) This is
because a proviso to the statute explains that Title VII does not require that minorities or women be hired
in numbers reflecting their representation in the local population. Title VII, § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j)
(1988). To not recognize some sort of affirmative defense under Title VII for practices yielding disparate
impacts would be to read this provision out of the statute. In contrast, Title VI's structure imposes no such
requirement and so one might argue that the appropriate Title VI justification burden on defendants ought
to be more demanding. See Watson, supra, at 971-77.
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
95. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
1596 [Vol. 101: 1577
Title VI
Cove, courts understood that construction as applying to Title VI too, even
though the Court's decision did not mention that statutory provision.
96
Congress' rejection of Wards Cove and its restoration of Griggs in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991-the first detailed statutory exposition of the disparate
impact doctrine-thus must apply to Title VI as well.
2. Adapting the Standard for Application Under Title VI
a. Prima Facie Case
Under current disparate impact doctrine as clarified by the 1991 CRA, a
plaintiff, in order to prove a prima facie case of discrimination, must "demon-
strate that [a] particular.., practice ' 97 serves to disqualify disproportionately
members of a protected class from eligibility for the benefit at issue. Generally,
plaintiffs cannot simply point to the bottom-line results of a complicated
selection process and challenge the process's overall discriminatory effect.
However, when "the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the
elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation
for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one ...
practice."
98
The critical question at the prima facie case stage concerns the relevant
benchmark against which the challenged practice's impact is measured. Title VI
disparate impact suits generally challenge the manner of distribution of a class
of public benefits. The public goods at issue in most cases-educational
opportunity,99  health care,1°°  subsidized public transport,"1  etc.° 2-- are
96. See Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1523 (M.D. Ala. 1991); Committee
for a Better N. Phila. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., CIV.A.88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 14, 1990); cf. Recent Case, 103 HARv. L. REV. 806,810 (1990) (assuming applicability of Wards Cove
standard under Title IX).
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(B)(i)) (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985)
(assignment to regular elementary school classes as opposed to classes for mentally retarded); Larry P. v.
Riles, 793 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D.
Ala. 1991) (college student access to teacher training program); cf. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't,
709 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Title IX challenge to state system for distributing college scholarships).
100. NAACP v. Medical Ctr., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (access to public hospital); Bryan
v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980) (access to public hospital); Linton v. Tennessee Comm'r of Health
& Env't, No. 3-87-0941, 1990 WL 314311 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 1990) (access to medicaid-funded nursing
home care).
101. Committee for a Better N. Phila. v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., CIV.A.88-1275, 1990 WL
121177 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1990) (distribution of subsidies among components of public transportation
system).
102. Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. ill. 1989) (freedom from
discriminatory siting of athletic stadium in minority community); Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block
Ass'n v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (freedom from concentration of homeless shelters
in minority communities).
1992] 1597
The Yale Law Journal
ones that, barring discrimination, one would expect would be distributed on a
uniform basis when provided by the government. In such cases, disparate
impact is measured by comparing the resulting access or distribution patterns
with overall population figures. However, for some public goods such as
government contracts, the courts unfortunately have held that no such
presumption of democratic distribution obtains. Instead they have required that
the pool of qualified MBE's in the jurisdiction-not general population
figures-serve as the standard for gauging adverse impact. 0 3
b. Affirmative Defenses
Once a Title VII plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of disparate impact,
the defendant may still avoid liability if it can "demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity."' 4 When hearing Title VI claims, courts have similarly allocated
to defendants at this stage the burden of affirmatively defending the challenged
practice, at the risk of nonpersuasion.'0 5
Importing the affirmative "necessity" defense into Title VI law has,
however, required some modification of the Title VII standard. Abstracted from
the employment context, the necessity defense essentially requires that the
challenged practice be significantly related to some institutional concern at the
core of the enterprise in question. For example, in Title VI education cases, the
courts have restyled the defense as one of "educational necessity."" 6 There
are, however, few reported decisions showing how the necessity standard is
applied in Title VI litigation involving other institutional settings.1°7
103. City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989); Latinos Unidos de Chelsea
en Accion (LUCHA) v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 799 F.2d 774,790-91 (1st Cir. 1986) ("it is not
sufficient to allege disparity between the number of minority residents and the number of contracts awarded
to minority businesses.") (Title VI case challenging contract distribution practices).
104. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(i)). The verb "demonstrate" is statutorily defined as meaning "[to] meet[] the burdens of
production and persuasion." Id. § 104, 105 Stat. at 1073 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)); see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975).
105. See Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th
Cir. 1985); Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 982-83 n.10 (9th Cir. 1984). One pre-Wards Cove Title VI
opinion held that the burden of persuasion did not shift to defendant at the justification stage, but rather
always remained with the plaintiff. NAACP v. Medical CIr., 657 E2d 1322, 1335 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc).
This holding was not, however, based on any claim that the Title VI disparate impact standard is weaker
than that of Title VII. Rather, the Third Circuit-alone among the courts of appeals-had held even prior
to Wards Cove that such was the proper burden allocation under Title VII as well. See Croker v. Boeing
Co., 662 F.2d 975, 991 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc). Since Croker has been overruled by the 1991 CRA,
Medical Center's holding as to the Title VI burden allocation is also no longer good law.
106. See, e.g., Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d at 1417-18; Lany P., 793
F.2d at 982-83 & nn.9-10; Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1529-30 (M.D. Ala.
1991); cf. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Title IX case).
107. In several of the noneducation cases, the plaintiffs failed to make out a prima facie case and so
the justification stage was never reached. Latinos Unidos de Chelsea en Accion, 799 F.2d at 790-91;
Coalition of Bedford-Stuyvesant Block Ass'n v. Cuomo, 651 F. Supp. 1202, 1209-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). In
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In spite of this paucity of case law, it seems likely that in many suits
challenging the way public institutions distribute other sorts of benefits, some
interest like "fiscal necessity" will be invoked in defense of challenged
practices."' 3 Prohibiting facially neutral benefits distribution practices that
result in a disparate impact against minorities-unless accomplished by
restructuring the challenged program so as to reduce expenditures
elsewhere-will often require increasing total program spending.10 9 It is hard
to deny the reality and importance of budgetary constraints on government
agencies today. Therefore, where it can be shown that flatly prohibiting a
challenged practice would have such a costly consequence, the focus of the suit
will then shift, and disposition of the challenge will depend on plaintiffs' ability
to show the availability of a less discriminatory, but comparably cost-effective,
alternative.
c. Less Discriminatory Alternatives
If a Title VII defendant carries its burden of establishing a business
justification for a challenged practice, the plaintiff may still prevail if she can
"show that other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial
effect, would also serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and
trustworthy workmanship."".. 0 This rebuttal is known as a showing of a less
another, once the plaintiff stated a prima facie case, the defendant capitulated, never attempting to advance
an affirmative defense. Linton v. Tennessee Comm'r of Health & Env't, No. 3-87-0941, 1990 WL 314311
(M.D. Tenn. Apr. 23, 1990).
108. See Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 617-18 (2d Cir. 1980); Committee for a Better N. Phila. v.
Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., CIV.A.88-1275, 1990 WL 121177, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 14, 1990). These
cases invoke fiscal necessity interests in finding the challenged practices to be justified. Although these
decisions illustrate the relevance of fiscal constraints to public institution decisionmaking, much of their
analysis is mistaken. Committee for a Better North Philadelphia applies the inappropriately weak version
of the disparate impact test which long prevailed in the Third Circuit but which was definitively rejected
by the 1991 CRA. See supra note 105. The logic of the Second Circuit's Bryan opinion is similarly flawed
because it accepts without analysis the conclusion that closing a public hospital was the appropriate response
to budgetary problems, ignoring the availability of a variety of other cost-saving measures. Exhibiting
deference more typical of mere rationality review than of disparate impact scrutiny under a civil rights
statute, Bryan was wrongly decided at the time and probably has not survived the 1991 CRA's clarification
of the necessity defense's appropriate weight. See Watson, supra note 92, at 966-71.
109. For example, the Bryan plaintiffs challenged a city decision to close a public hospital serving a
largely minority community. Though the closure plainly reduced health-care access disproportionately for
people of color, an order requiring the hospital to remain open would-unless accompanied by other
provisions for effecting cost savings elsewhere-have prevented the city from implementing fiscally
necessitated budget reductions. See Bryan, 627 F.2d at 614-17.
110. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). The new statute restored the law to its pre-Wards Cove state on this
point: "The demonstration ... shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, [the day
before Wards Cove was decided]... with respect to the concept of 'alternative employment practice'." Civil
Rights Act of 1991, § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C)). The statute
also provides, however, that defendant must "refuse[] to adopt [the] alternative employment practice." Id.
§ 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)). Courts may interpret this
language as requiring that any alternatives be proposed prior to the lawsuit in order to give the defendant
an opportunity to adopt or reject them.
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discriminatory alternative. Courts hearing Title VI cases similarly should permit
plaintiffs to overcome defendants' affirmative necessity defenses by showing
the availability of less discriminatory alternatives that still serve the important
institutional needs of the defendant.'
This is a critical stage in a disparate impact case, because governmental
defendants usually advance various necessity defenses. Courts are generally
unlikely to reject a government's affirmative defense unless plaintiffs have




Application of Title VI to the process for selecting the prime contractor on
a major public works project probably would not make much of a difference.
The position of prime contractor for a large construction job usually requires
the resources of a multimillion dollar firm. Since there are very few minority-
owned construction companies of this size,113 and since Title VI only
prohibits processes that exclude otherwise qualified firms from public
contracting, n 4 Title VI imposes few limits on the procedures used to select
prime contractors for such projects. For smaller projects for which there do
exist eligible MBE bidders, however, a Title VI action might indeed be able
to facilitate greater participation by people of color.
The contracting rules of most government bodies require that contractors,
when bidding on construction jobs, post surety bonds guaranteeing that the state
will be compensated for its lost time and additional administrative expense in
111. Cf. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Title IX
case) (government's affirmative defense rebutted by showing of less discriminatory alternative). In Bryan,
the Second Circuit refused to consider plaintiffs' proposed alternatives, holding that the opportunity to rebut
a necessity defense through a showing of a less discriminatory alternative applied only to a limited extent
under Title VI. Bryan, 627 F.2d at 619. Given the 1991 CRA's rejection of Wards Cove's weakening of
the less-discriminatory-alternative prong of disparate impact analysis, see supra note 110, Bryan's treatment
of this issue would appear to be erroneous. See also Watson, supra note 92, at 976-77.
112. But see Groves v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 776 F. Supp. 1518, 1530-31 (M.D. Ala. 1991)
(rejecting government's affirmative justification even without plaintiffs' proposing any less discriminatory
alternative).
113. In 1987, of the 83,897 American construction firms with annual receipts of $1 million or more,
only 730 (fewer than 1%) were owned by people of color. Of the 4547 construction companies that
employed at least 100 workers, only 21 (fewer than 0.5%) were minority owned. See BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. NO. ES87-3,1987 ENTERPRISE STATIsTICS: COMPANY SUMMARY
14 tbl. 2, 56 tbl. 4 (1991); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. MB87-1, 1987
ECONOMIC CENSUSES: SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRisES-BLACK 59 tbl. 8, 61 tbL 9
(1990); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. MB87-2, 1987 ECONOMIC
CENSUSES: SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES-HISPANIC 85 tbl. 11, 87 tbl. 12 (1991);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. MB87-3, 1987 ECONOMIC CENSUSES:
SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINEss ENTERPRISES-ASIAN AMERICANS, AMERICAN INDIANS, AND
OTHER MINORITIES 105 tbl. 11, 107 tbl. 12 (1991).
114. See supra text accompanying note 103.
1600
Title VI
the event a firm selected for a project reneges on its bid.115 Similarly, firms
selected for public contracts are required by most cities and states to post
performance and payment bonds. Performance bonds protect the contracting
state in the event of contractor nonperformance.116 Payment bonds ensure that
persons supplying labor or materials to the prime contractor or its
subcontractors will be paid in the event the prime contractor does not make
good on its obligations. 17 Contractors selected for public projects are also
often required to obtain substantial liability insurance.
These requirements have a disparate impact on MBE's since MBE's often
have trouble obtaining bonding and insurance or must pay higher rates than
white-owned firms for comparable coverage. 8 This disparity stems from
market discrimination'19 and the fact that MBE's are on average smaller,
younger, and less well capitalized than white-owned firms,"W and so may
constitute worse credit risks. If bonding requirements can be shown to be either
unnecessary or replaceable by less discriminatory alternatives, they are
susceptible to a Title VI challenge.
A Title VI suit could be brought by individual MBE's or a class of such
firms against the state agency imposing such burdensome requirements.
Individual MBE plaintiffs might begin by submitting bids for a given project
but without posting bid bonds in the amounts required. When their bids are
rejected as nonresponsive, the firms might then sue, charging a violation of
Title VI's requirement that public benefits be distributed through nondiscrimi-
natory processes. If an individual MBE were selected for a contract but the
115. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS § 5-301 (ABA Section
of Pub. Contract Law & Section of Urban, State & Local Gov't Law 1979) [hereinafter MODEL
PROCUREMENT CODE] (requiring bid security bond); ANNOTATIONS TO THE MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE
FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 89-93 (2d Supp. 1990) [hereinafter ANNOTATIONS TO MODEL
PROCUREMENT CODE] (cataloging bid security bonding requirements of various states; bond usually must
equal 5 or 10% of total bid); AILEEN C. HERNANDEZ Assoc., REPORT TO THE SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE-A STUDY, WITH RECOMMENDATIONS, OF
THE IMPACTS ON MINORITY-OWNED, ,vOMEN-OWNED AND SMALL BUSINESsES OF BONDING, INSURANCE,
AND OTHER FEE-RELATED REQUIREMENTS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE CITY AND COUNTY
OF SAN FRANCISCO FOR BUSINESSES ENTERING INTO CONTRACTS WITH SUCH AGENCIES 67 (Sept. 30,1985)
[hereinafter HERNANDEZ] (cataloging same for San Francisco city and county agencies; 10% bond generally
required).
116. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 115, § 5-302(1)(a) (requiring performance bond);
ANNOTATIONS TO MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 115, at 89-93 (cataloging contract performance
bonding requirements of various states; bond usually must equal 50 or 100% of contractprice); HERNANDEZ,
supra note 115, at 67 (cataloging same for San Francisco city and county agencies; 50 or 100% bonds
generally required).
117. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 115, § 5-302(1)(b) (requiring payment bond);
ANNOTATIONS TO MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 115, at 89-93 (cataloging contract payment
bonding requirements of various states; bond usually must equal 50 or 100% of contract price).
118. See HERNANDEZ, supra note 115, at 30 (finding adverse impact of bonding and insurance
requirements on MBE's).
119. See GLOVER, supra note 2, at 57-60 (discussing discrimination in the bonding industry); see also
Gavin M. Chen & John A. Cole, The Myths, Facts and Theories of Ethnic, Small-Scale Enterprise
Financing, REV. BLACK POL ECON., Spring 1988, at 111, 119-23 (describing discrimination against Black-
owned firms in commercial lending).
120. See data cited supra note 113.
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offer was then rescinded when the firm failed to post performance and payment
bonds for the stipulated amounts or to obtain insurance in the amounts required,
it might then mount a similar Title VI challenge to those requirements.
States would probably attempt to defend these practices as necessary to
protect the state against the costs of contractor default or job-site accident. If,
however, plaintiffs can show that the bonding levels required exceed that
necessary to provide a sufficient deterrent against contractor default and fully
compensate the state for the costs it would suffer in that event, then a court
might find such regulations impermissibly stringent."' Similarly, liability
insurance requirements might be unnecessary, particularly when applied to small
construction projects."2 In such situations, the government's affirmative
"necessity" defense would fail.
If the government carried its burden at the defense stage, the court might
still invalidate bonding requirements if plaintiffs then demonstrated the
availability of a less discriminatory alternative. Even if it were proven necessary
to require contractors to post substantial performance and payment bonds at the
start of a contract, it does not follow that those requirements must remain in
effect for the duration of the contract. A less discriminatory alternative that
would lessen the burden of bonding requirements would be to reduce the size
of the bonds as work is completed on the project. This arrangement would
minimize the economic burden on contractors while still providing the state
with adequate indemnification against contractor default.
One of the reasons bonding and insurance requirements disproportionately
exclude MBE's from public contracting is that MBE's tend to have less capital
than white-owned firms. Rules that increase the debt a contractor must carry
over the course of a contract thus have a disparate impact on MBE's. Although
under most public contracts the project price is paid out to the contractor
periodically under a progress payment system, a portion of the contract price
is usually withheld by the state until the project is completed.123 Such a policy
might be challenged under Title VI and could be invalidated where shown to
121. Even Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Croson recognized that
[slimplification of bidding procedures [and] relaxation of bonding requirements... would open
the public contracting market to all those who have suffered the effects of past societal
discrimination or neglect. Many of the formal barriers to new entrants may be the product of
bureaucratic inertia more than actual necessity, and may have a disproportionate effect on the
opportunities open to new minority firms. Their elimination or modification would have little
detrimental effect on the city's interests and would serve to increase the opportunities available
to minority business ....
City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989).
122. See Margaret C. Simms, Governmental Regulations as an Obstacle to Minority Participation in
Government Contracting: Implications for Meeting the Croson Standard, in CROSON COLLECTION, supra
note 6, at 116, 118 [hereinafter Simms, Governmental Regulations] (noting problem of unnecessarily
stringent contractor liability insurance requirements); MARGARET C. SIMMs, THE IMPACT OF STATE AND
LOcAL REGULATION ON MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 34 (Urban Institute Project Report 1987)
[hereinafter SIMMS, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION] (reporting that Chicago imposes $10 million liability
insurance requirement for all public contracts regardless of size).
123. Telephone Interview with James J. Petersen, Bonding Industry Consultant (Feb. 2, 1992).
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be unnecessary. Because contractors are already required to post performance
bonds, withholding payment of an extra portion of the contract price until
project completion may not be necessary to protect the state against contractor
nonperformance. Minimizing the period of time that contractors must carry part
of a project's cost would reduce the adverse effects of MBE undercapitalization.
In addition to setting bonding and insurance requirements, public entities
frequently take into account factors such as the number of years a firm has been
in business when selecting among bidders for public contracts." This
practice has a disparate impact on MBE's because, on average, such firms are
younger than white-owned companies.125 Though they have often formed their
firms only recently, many MBE owners have extensive experience in their
fields, gained through years of work as employees. 12 Substituting an evaluation
that takes into account total years of experience would constitute a less
discriminatory alternative that would still satisfy the state's interest in ensuring
that bidders are qualified for the work.
Using past experience with a specific category of work as a bidder
evaluation criterion also tends to disadvantage MBE's. Some states define
relevant prior experience very narrowly, asking for background in specific
subspecialty areas or experience with government contracts. 127 Because
MBE's tend to have less overall experience than white-owned firms, they are
less likely to have done work in a particular subspecialty or with a public client.
Use of such restrictive experience requirements perpetuates MBE exclusion
from the network of firms regularly awarded public contracts because it makes
eligibility for current contracts depend in part on whether a firm has been able
to win such contracts in the past.'2 Insofar as relevant experience is defined
unnecessarily narrowly, use of such criteria might be rejected under Title VI
in favor of broader, less discriminatory substitutes.129
A final bidder selection practice susceptible to Title VI challenge is the use
of Subjective "overall evaluations" in assessing bid proposals. 3 ' Where it can
124. Use of such criteria is especially common in public contracting for professional services related
to construction work. See, e.g., San Francisco International Airport, Request for Proposals for
Architectural/Engineering Services for Construction of New Firehouse No. 2, Firm Selection Qualifications
Point System [hereinafter Fire Station RFP] (on file with author) (evaluation based in part on years of
experience).
125. TIMOTHY BATES, THE ROLE OF BLACK ENTERPRISE IN URBAN DEVELOPiENT (forthcoming 1992);
see also Simms, Governmental Regulations, supra note 122, at 118 (discussing problem of unnecessarily
stringent bidder experience requirements).
126. GLOVER, supra note 2, at 15,20; Letter from Theodore H. Wang, General Counsel, Coalition for
Economic Equity, to Dennis P. Bouey, Deputy Director, San Francisco International Airport 1 (Nov. 13,
1991) [hereinafter Fire Station Letter] (on file with author).
127. See, e.g., Fire Station RFP, supra note 124, at 2 (evaluation based in part on prior experience
building firehouses).
128. Saws, STATE AND LOCAL REGULATIoN, supra note 122, at 41.
129. Id.; see also Fire Station Letter, supra note 126, at 2 (experience building firehouses demanded
where background working on any type of public safety or emergency service building would suffice).
130. See, e.g., Fine Arts Museum of San Francisco, Request forProposals for ArchitecturaVEngineering
Services for Renovation of and Addition to California Palace of the Legion of Honor 5 (Dec. 6, 1990) (on
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be shown that MBE's consistently receive worse ratings than majority firms
in such evaluations, their use in the bid evaluation process can be banned under
Title VI unless the state can show that they are necessary."'
2. Subcontracting
With respect to subcontracting, Title VI litigation might well be able to
effect real change. The potential here is large because there is a lot of money
at stake and there are qualified MBE's available to take on most subcontract-
size projects.'
The subcontracting problem is significant because while cities and states
closely regulate the letting of prime contracts, subcontracting remains almost
entirely unregulated. Except where MBE set-asides are required, prime contrac-
tors are generally allowed unfettered discretion in selecting subcontractors.3
Prime contractors usually do not publicly solicit subcontracting bids, but instead
simply funnel jobs to firms with which they are familiar and feel comfortable
working.13 This practice severely disadvantages MBE's since minority
owners are usually excluded from the "old boy" contracting network. The
discretionary nature of this selection process leaves MBE's highly vulnerable
to discrimination by white prime contractors.
Unless state failure to regulate subcontracting is challenged, public contract-
ing becomes a winner-take-all game played with a stacked deck. MBE's should
not be denied the opportunity to compete on an equal basis for smaller subcon-
tracting jobs just because few MBE's are qualified to bid for contracts as
primes. Refusing to regulate subcontracting surrenders the privilege of doling
out plum subcontracting jobs to those relatively few firms large enough to bid
for prime contracts. Where this discretion is consistently exercised in a
discriminatory fashion, the policy of nonregulation violates Title VI.
To mount a Title VI challenge to such practices, a group of plaintiff MBE's
qualified to do the subcontracting work in question would have to assemble
statistics showing that the subcontractor selection processes employed by prime
contractors on recent state projects have yielded an MBE participation level
file with author) (assessment based in part on "overall evaluation").
131. Under Title VII, use of subjective evaluations as a basis for hiring and promotion decisions can
be challenged under the disparate impact standard. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990-
91 (1988); Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1525 (3d Cir. 1988), vacated, 490 U.S. 1103 (1989), reaff'd
on remand, 896 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 53 (1990). Such evaluations have been
found illegal where they have been conducted in a way that disproportionately disadvantages women or
racial minorities and where their use has not otherwise been shown to be necessary. EEOC v. Rath Packing
Co., 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986).
132. See sources cited supra note 113.
133. See, e.g., MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE, supra note 115 (imposing no selection procedures or
criteria regulating subcontracting). Even California, one of the very few states that have recently established
rules governing some aspects of subcontracting, imposes no limits on subcontractor selection. See CAL. PUB.
CONTRACT CODE §§ 4100-4114 (West Supp. 1992).
134. GLOVER, supra note 2, at 55-56.
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below those firms' representation in the pool of eligible potential contractors.
The challenged practice would be the state's policy of not regulating
subcontracting. Plaintiffs would propose as a less discriminatory alternative that
the availability of such work be advertised and that subcontractor selection be
conducted on the basis of publicly stipulated criteria.
Title VI requires that when federal funds recipients delegate decisionmaking
authority to third parties, those parties exercise that authority in a
nondiscriminatory fashion.135 Courts have held under Title VII that filling job
openings through nepotism or through limited recruitment from among the
friends of current workers violates Title VII where such practices
disproportionately exclude women or people of color.136 Because doctrine
developed in Title VII cases also governs disparate impact claims brought under
Title VI,'37 delegation of subcontracting discretion to prime contractors who
then distribute those subcontracts through a nonpublic process is susceptible
to challenge. States that allow unregulated subcontracting violate Title VI where
prime contractors exercise such delegated discretion with discriminatory effect.
Once plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case in such a suit, the
defendant state would bear the burden of defending the challenged practices.
Such a defense would be difficult since the advantages achieved by permitting
primes to give all their work to handpicked subs-perhaps an incremental
improvement in efficiency due to familiarity-are not urgent public concerns.
Indeed, unregulated subcontracting seems geared more towards perpetuating
nepotism and cronyism than serving any compelling public purpose.
3. Job Distribution
A job distribution claim would be brought by minority construction workers
employed by bidder firms with racially integrated work forces. It would
challenge government contracting practices that serve systematically to steer
public contracts toward firms that fail to hire people of color. The problem,
however, is that almost all of the factors that influence contracting decisions
are linked in some way to characteristics of bidder firms. It is difficult to
identify contracting practices or criteria that, independent of the nature of the
contractor, correlate with characteristics of work forces of bidder firms.
A suit brought by workers could, however, still challenge those contracting
practices that serve disproportionately to exclude MBE's.138 This is possible
because work force composition correlates with firm status: MBE's tend to hire
135. See supra Part LC.2.
136. EEOC v. Local 798, United Ass'n of Journeymen, 646 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (N.D. Okla. 1986);
Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421, 435-36 (W.D. Wash. 1977), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1429
(9th Cir.), modified, 742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984).
137. See cases cited supra note 91.
138. For a catalog of such practices, see supra text accompanying notes 113-136.
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many people of color while white-owned firms do not 139 Thus, the same
contracting practices that disadvantage MBE's--excessive bonding requirements
and failure to regulate subcontracting, for example-also steer employment
opportunities away from minority workers employed in the construction trades.
A Title VI suit filed by workers would thus only duplicate the sorts of
claims that MBE contractors and subcontractors could already bring and so,
formally speaking, would hold no greater potential for increasing minority
participation in public contracting. Framing a Title VI claim in terms of jobs,
however, would highlight that what is at issue is not just the way profitable
contracts are doled out among businesses, but also the way government
subsidizes economic opportunity at the community level. Because courts may
have more sympathy for workers than for contractors, a suit that included
employees as an additional plaintiff class might enjoy greater success than one
brought by MBE owners alone challenging the same categories of practices.
A suit focusing on the employment opportunity consequences of contracting
practices would be brought by a class composed of people of color employed
in the work forces of different MBE contractors. Plaintiffs would gather
statistics showing (1) the correlation in that region between firm status
(MBE/non-MBE) and work force composition, and (2) that particular practices
selected for challenge have served disproportionately to disqualify the plaintiffs'
MBE employers from eligibility for recent public contracts. Combined, these
two sets of statistics would establish that the defendant state's contractor and
subcontractor selection processes cause a disparate impact in the distribution
of job opportunities between white and minority workers. Once plaintiffs had
stated a prima facie case, consideration of the relevant affirmative defenses and
less discriminatory alternatives for the challenged practices would follow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Many of the problems suffered disproportionately by people of color stem
from the radically unequal distribution of wealth in this country. Because there
are very few MBE's large enough to take on major construction projects,
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws--even those incorporating the effects
test-cannot remedy their underrepresentation among prime contractors for such
jobs. Substantial numbers of MBE's are qualified, however, to perform smaller
scale contracting and subcontracting. The exclusion of such firms from publicly
funded work as a result of discriminatory contracting practices can therefore
be challenged under Title VI. With the disappearance of many set-aside
programs in the wake of Croson, Title VI provides an alternative legal tool for
people of color in their fight for a greater share of the benefits flowing from
publicly funded development.
139. See supra note 2.
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